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Abstract
Normal default logic (NDL) and semi-normal default logic (SNDL) are syntactically restricted
variants of Reiter’s default logic (DL). Although semi-normal defaults have only a slightly more
general form than normal defaults, SNDL does not share the nice properties of NDL (e.g., semi-
monotonicity). In this note, we address the effect of semi-normality on the expressive power of
defaults, using a classification method based on polynomial, faithful, and modular (PFM) translation
functions. The resulting classification indicates that SNDL and DL are of equal expressive power,
which strictly exceeds that of NDL. This strengthens an earlier result achieved by Marek and
Truszczyn´ski, who establish the equivalence of weak semi-normal defaults with general defaults.
Furthermore, it is established that prerequisite-free fragments of DL and SNDL (PDL and PSNDL)
are of equal expressive power. Consequently, PSNDL is less expressive than DL and SNDL,
incomparable with NDL, and more expressive than preferential entailment (a generalized form of
circumscription). The latter result is in sharp contrast with Imielinski’s result, which states that
prerequisite-free and semi-normal default theories can be modularly translated into preferential
entailment.
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1. Introduction
Reiter’s default logic (DL) [29] is one of the major formalizations of non-monotonic
reasoning (NMR) and has important applications in artificial intelligence, such as planning
[3], diagnosis [30], and product configuration [33].
The relationships between DL and other non-monotonic logics have been extensively
studied [1,4,8,10–12,17,18,21–23,28,32,34]. The basic approach in this line of research
is establishing semantics-preserving translations between non-monotonic logics. A sys-
tematic analysis is performed in [16], where polynomial, faithful, and modular (PFM)
translations are distinguished as the measure for comparing the expressive powers of non-
monotonic logics. As a result, six different non-monotonic logics from [19,22–24,26,29,
35] are ordered to form an expressive power hierarchy (EPH), as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Reiter’s DL has a prominent role in EPH as it resides in the (so far) most expressive
class. The current EPH [16] also covers syntactically restricted variants of DL: normal
DL (NDL) and prerequisite-free DL (PDL), as well as their hybrid (PNDL). All of these
reside strictly below DL in EPH, which indicates that syntactic restrictions tend to decrease
the expressiveness of defaults as expected.
The theories of NDL are appealing, as they possess interesting properties in contrast to
general default theories [29]; the existence of an extension is guaranteed and defaults can
be applied in a semi-monotonic fashion. However, Reiter and Criscuolo [31] note that in
practice normal defaults are insufficient to handle interactions among defaults properly. As
a remedy, they introduce semi-normal defaults that are of slightly more general form and
enable refined control over the applicability of defaults. Unfortunately, semi-normal DL
(SNDL) does not enjoy the nice properties of NDL [31]. This observation suggests that the
expressive power of SNDL exceeds that of NDL to some extent. However, earlier results
[9,10,20,23,31] on SNDL leave the exact relationship of SNDL to other non-monotonic
logics open.
In this note, we evaluate the effect of semi-normality on the expressiveness of defaults.
Technically speaking, we apply the classification method based on PFM translations [16] in
order to compare the expressive power of SNDL with that of DL and NDL (note from Fig. 1
that DL and NDL reside in different classes of EPH). For the sake of comprehensiveness,
Fig. 1. Expressive Power Hierarchy (EPH) of non-monotonic logics.
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a similar comparison is performed for the prerequisite-free variants of the three logics
(PDL, PNDL, and PSNDL). The remaining sections of this note are composed as follows.
The basic notions of Reiter’s DL [29] (including its various syntactically restricted forms)
are reviewed in Section 2. The classification method based on PFM translations and the
current EPH [16] is presented in Section 3. The actual expressiveness analysis takes
place in Section 4 (long proofs have been moved to Appendix A). As the main results
of this note, it is established that (i) DL and SNDL, and (ii) PDL and PSNDL, are of
equal expressive power. A comparison of these results with related work is performed
in Section 5. In particular, the first result strengthens another, achieved by Marek and
Truszczyn´ski [23], who establish the equivalence of DL and a variant of SNDL. Moreover,
the latter result implies that PSNDL cannot be modularly translated into preferential
entailment (a generalization of McCarthy’s circumscription), which contradicts a result
achieved by Imielinski [10]. Finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2. Syntactic variants of Reiter’s default logic
We begin with a short introduction to Reiter’s default logic [29] in the propositional
case. We are assuming that the reader is familiar with the basic syntactic and semantic
notions of classical propositional logic (CL). To fix some notation, we let L stand for
a propositional language and we write L(A) to declare that L is based on a (at most
countable) set of propositional atoms A. Then given any theory T ⊆ L, the closure of T
under propositional consequence is Cn(T )= {φ ∈ L | T |= φ}. Moreover, we write T ‖ φ
to mean that a sentence φ ∈ L is propositionally consistent with a theory T ⊆ L, i.e., when
the theory T ∪{φ} is propositionally consistent. Then T ‖ 	 expresses the fact that a theory
T ⊆ L is propositionally consistent, i.e., T 
|= ⊥.1
A default theory in a propositional language L is a pair 〈D,T 〉 where T ⊆ L and D is
a set of default rules (or defaults) of the form
α : β1, . . . , βn
γ
(1)
such that n  0 and the prerequisite α, the justifications β1, . . . , βn, and the consequent
γ of the rule are sentences of L. The intuition behind a rule (1) is that γ can be inferred
whenever α is inferable and each justification βi can be consistently assumed. Given a set
of defaults D, we let Jf(D) and Cq(D) stand for the sets of justifications and consequents
that appear in D, respectively.
Let us now turn our attention to the semantics of defaults. Following an idea propounded
by Marek and Truszczyn´ski [23], we reduce a set of defaultsD to a set of ordinary inference
rules by interpreting the justifications with respect to a propositional theory E ⊆ L. The
reduct2 DE contains an inference rule αγ whenever there is a default (1) such that E ‖ βi
holds for all 0 < i  n. Given T ⊆ L and a set of inference rules R in L, the closure
1 The propositional constants 	 and ⊥ stand for truth and falsity, respectively.
2 This is analogous to the Gelfond–Lifschitz reduct of normal logic programs [7], but rephrased for default
theories rather than normal logic programs.
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CnR(T ) of T under R and propositional consequence can be defined as the least theory
E ⊆ L satisfying (i) T ⊆ E, (ii) Cn(E) ⊆ E, and (iii) {γ | α
γ
∈ R and α ∈E} ⊆ E [23,
Theorem 3.7]. A sentence φ ∈ CnR(T ) if and only if φ is R-provable3 from T [13]: there
is a sequence α1
γ1
, . . . , αn
γn
of inference rules from R such that T ∪ {γ1, . . . , γn} |= φ and
T ∪ {γ1, . . . , γi−1} |= αi holds for each 0 < i  n. Reiter [29] defines the semantics of a
default theory 〈D,T 〉 by associating a set of extensions E ⊆ L with 〈D,T 〉. However,
rather than presenting Reiter’s original quasi-inductive definition of extensions, we resort
to an alternative definition [23], given below as Definition 1. The number of extensions
possessed by a default theory 〈D,T 〉 may vary in general. In the sequel, default logic (DL)
is the non-monotonic logic based on default theories under Reiter’s extensions. For more
details and insights on DL, we suggest Reiter’s classic articles [29,31], as well as books on
default reasoning and NMR in general [2,5,6,23].
Definition 1 (Marek and Truszczyn´ski [23]). A theory E ⊆ L is an extension of a default
theory 〈D,T 〉 in L if and only if E = CnDE (T ).
Normality and semi-normality (see, e.g., [31]) are examples of syntactic constraints
imposed on defaults of the general form (1). A normal default is of the form α:γ
γ
which
corresponds to stipulating n= 1 and β1 = γ in (1). Thus the consistency of the consequent
γ is tested before the default is applied. This implies that a propositional contradiction
cannot be derived using normal defaults. A default theory 〈D,T 〉 is normal if D contains
only normal defaults. The fragment of DL corresponding to normal default theories under
Reiter’s extensions is called normal DL (NDL). A semi-normal default is of a slightly
more general form α:γ∧β
γ
, which incorporates a refined justification γ ∧ β compared to
plain γ in the normal case. Semi-normal default theories and semi-normal DL (SNDL) are
defined analogously to normal default theories and NDL. Yet another syntactic restriction
concerns prerequisites: a default (1) is prerequisite-free if α = 	. A shorthand :β1,...,βn
γ
is often used for such a default. A default theory 〈D,T 〉 is prerequisite-free if D is
prerequisite-free, and prerequisite-free DL (PDL) is the corresponding fragment of DL. We
may also combine prerequisite-freedom with normality and semi-normality. This gives rise
to prerequisite-free NDL (PNDL) and prerequisite-free SNDL (PSNDL), where defaults
are of the simplified forms :β
β
and :γ∧β
γ
, respectively.
3. Classification method and expressive power hierarchy
In this section, we review our method [16] for classifying non-monotonic logics on the
basis of their expressive powers. Let us start by introducing some common notation and
definitions for non-monotonic logics in the propositional case. In general, a non-monotonic
theory is a pair 〈X,T 〉 where T ⊆ L is a propositional subtheory and X is any set(s) of
syntactic elements which is/are specific to the non-monotonic logic L in question (such
3 Marek and Truszczyn´ski [23] propose a slightly different proof system for the same purpose by incorporating
the inference rules of R into a propositional proof system.
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as a set of default rules D in Reiter’s DL). A non-monotonic logic L is identified as a set
of finite non-monotonic theories in definitions to come. In analogy to DL, the semantics
of a non-monotonic theory 〈X,T 〉 is determined by the extensions of 〈X,T 〉, i.e., the sets of
conclusions E ⊆ L associated with 〈X,T 〉. Finally, we let ‖〈X,T 〉‖ denote the length
of a non-monotonic theory 〈X,T 〉 which is the number of symbol occurrences needed to
represent the theory 〈X,T 〉 in terms of symbols. Our requirements for translation functions
are as follows.
Definition 2. A translation function Tr :L1 →L2 is
(1) polynomial if and only if for all 〈X,T 〉 ∈ L1, the time required to compute
Tr(〈X,T 〉) ∈ L2 is polynomial in ‖〈X,T 〉‖;
(2) faithful if and only if for all 〈X,T 〉 ∈ L1, the propositionally consistent extensions of
〈X,T 〉 ∈L1 and Tr(〈X,T 〉) ∈ L2 are in a one-to-one correspondence and coincide up
to the propositional language L of T ;
(3) modular if and only if for all 〈X,T 〉 ∈ L1, the translation Tr(〈X,T 〉) = 〈X′, T ′ ∪ T 〉
where 〈X′, T ′〉 = Tr(〈X,∅〉).
Let us brief our justifications for the three requirements.4 The polynomiality condition
bounds the time as well as space needed for computing a translation. The aim of the
faithfulness condition is to preserve the semantics of a non-monotonic theory 〈X,T 〉
to a reasonable degree. In contrast to other approaches, such as [8,23], we ignore
propositionally inconsistent extensions. This is because inconsistent extensions behave
differently in different non-monotonic logics and ignoring them has turned out to be
essential in order to establish translations in certain cases. For instance, an inconsistent
extension excludes others in DL but not in Moore’s autoepistemic logic (AEL) [26]. Then a
one-to-one correspondence of extensions, so that extensions coincide up toL, is impossible
unless inconsistent extensions are ignored [11]. This aspect of Definition 2 is also critical
regarding the faithfulness of the translation function TrSN presented in this note. It is
also worth pointing out that our notion of faithfulness supports cautious reasoning with
extensions, i.e., their intersection is of interest, but brave reasoning is preserved as far
as propositionally consistent extensions are considered. Moreover, our condition admits a
further degree of freedom, as it permits translation functions to introduce new propositional
atoms. This option is already present in the notion of semi-representability proposed
by Marek and Truszczyn´ski [23] and it plays a crucial role when embedding DL into
Marek and Truszczyn´ski’s strong autoepistemic logic (SAEL) [11]. Finally, the modularity
condition obliges the translation of X to be independent of T and thus unaffected by any
changes made to T . Our condition is a generalization of the one imposed by Gottlob
[8] on specific translation functions from DL to AEL. It is important to note that many
translation functions are modular in a much stronger sense, e.g., the parameters in X can
be translated independently of each other. Put more formally, the translation function Tr
satisfies Tr(X ∪ Y ) = Tr(X) ∪ Tr(Y ) for any sets of parameters X and Y . However, the
4 The reader is referred to [14–16] for more details and related work.
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Table 1
Relations among non-monotonic logics
Relation Definition Explanation
L1 ⇒L2 L1 → L2 and L2 
→L1 L1 is less expressive than L2
L1 ↔L2 L1 → L2 and L2 → L1 L1 and L2 are equally expressive
L1 
↔L2 L1 
→L2 and L2 
→L1 L1 and L2 are incomparable
current condition is justifiable to retain the strength of our intranslatability theorems [16],
which establish the fact that a (modular) translation function is impossible in certain cases.
For the sake of brevity, a translation function Tr :L1 → L2 is called PFM if it
is polynomial, faithful, and modular simultaneously. In particular, we note that any
composition of PFM translation functions is also PFM [16]. PFM translation functions
provide us with a framework for analyzing the relative expressive power of non-monotonic
logics. The idea behind this is that if there is a PFM translation function that maps the
theories of one non-monotonic logic L1 to the theories of another non-monotonic logic
L2, then we consider L2 to be at least as expressive as L1 (denoted by L1 → L2).
This gives rise to a preorder (i.e., a reflexive and transitive relation) on the class of non-
monotonic logics. In certain cases, we are able to discover a counter-example to establish
that L1 
→L2, i.e., there is no PFM translation function from L1 to L2. The relations →
and 
→ form the basic building blocks of the more complex relations listed in Table 1. Note
that the relation ⇒ is a strict partial order on the equivalence classes induced by → .
In [16], these relations are used as the basis for a systematic comparison of the
expressive powers of non-monotonic logics. As a result of the analysis, the expressive
power hierarchy (EPH) of non-monotonic logics is obtained. The current EPH is illustrated
in Fig. 1. There are five different equivalence classes, each of which is explained below.
(1) The topmost class in Fig. 1 contains the most expressive non-monotonic logics, namely
DL and Marek and Truszczyn´ski’s strong autoepistemic logic (SAEL) [22], as well as
Wang et al.’s priority logic (PL) [35].
(2) Below this class, on the right-hand side, there is a class with less expressive non-
monotonic logics, including Moore’s autoepistemic logic (AEL) [26], PDL, and weak
default logic (WDL) [23], which is based on a weaker notion of extensions than the
one given in Definition 1.
(3) On the left-hand side, we have a class containing NDL which is incomparable with the
previous class. In [16] this is proved to be caused by two factors: (i) some inference
rules in NDL (and DL) cannot be properly grasped by the logics in the previous class,
and (ii) the existence of extensions is guaranteed in NDL, while not in the logics of the
previous class.
(4) Below these two classes, there is a less expressive class containing Lifschitz’ parallel
circumscription (CIRC) [19], as well as PNDL.
(5) Classical propositional logic (CL) resides at the bottom of the hierarchy to make our
view complete. Any propositional theory T can be viewed as a parameterless non-
monotonic theory with a unique extension Cn(T ).
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In contrast with earlier results on expressiveness [1,8], the classes of EPH indicate that
AEL and PDL are of equal expressive power and less expressive than DL and SAEL.
However, the differing views can be understood by the criteria imposed on translation
functions [16]. It is also worth pointing out that every class of current EPH can be
characterized by a syntactic variant of DL: (unrestricted) DL, NDL, PDL, PNDL, and
CL (i.e., DL without defaults). The structure of EPH indicates that syntactic restrictions
on defaults tend to decrease the expressive power of the resulting variants of DL. The
above considerations motivate the use of PFM translation functions, as well as EPH, for
investigating the effect of semi-normality on the expressiveness of defaults.
4. Expressiveness analysis
As explained in Section 3, the expressive powers of PDL, NDL, and PNDL have already
been analyzed [16]. In this section, we perform a similar analysis for SNDL and PSNDL
in order to locate their exact positions in EPH. We start by showing how the current EPH
provides lower and upper bounds for the expressiveness of SNDL (recall the structure of
EPH from Fig. 1).
Proposition 3. NDL→ SNDL→DL.
Proof. Since semi-normal defaults α:γ∧β
γ
are special cases of (1), we may appeal to the
identity translation TrI(〈D,T 〉) = 〈D,T 〉 and conclude that SNDL → DL. On the other
hand, any normal default α:γ
γ
can be translated into an equivalent semi-normal default
α:γ∧	
γ
. Consider a normal default theory 〈D,T 〉 in L and its translation Tr	(〈D,T 〉) =
〈D′, T 〉 by this principle. It follows that D′E =DE holds true for any E ⊆ L. Then E ⊆ L
is an extension of 〈D,T 〉 if and only if E is an extension of 〈D′, T 〉. Thus Tr	 is clearly
PFM. ✷
There is a significant difference between NDL and SNDL: a normal default theory has
always at least one extension [23, p. 107], but this is not guaranteed for semi-normal default
theories in general. Probably the simplest counter-example [31] in this respect is a semi-
normal set of defaults D = { :p∧¬qp , :q∧¬rq , :r∧¬pr } containing three circularly interdependent
defaults so that no extension is established for 〈D,∅〉. In the sequel, we shall use D as
a primitive for excluding extensions. In order to control such a primitive, we extend D
with three additional defaults in Example 4. Roughly speaking, the idea is to activate the
defaults of D and thus prevent the realization of extensions only when f is present. We have
carefully chosen the additional defaults so as to be both semi-normal and prerequisite-free,
so that the resulting primitive is applicable within SNDL as well as PSNDL.
Example 4. Consider a semi-normal and prerequisite-free set of defaults
C =
{ : p∧¬q
p
,
: q∧¬r
q
,
: r∧¬p
r
}
∪
{ : p∧¬f
p
,
: q∧¬f
q
,
: r∧¬f
r
}
(2)
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and any default theory 〈D,T 〉 in L(A) such that A ∩ {p,q, r, f} = ∅. Then it holds for any
E ⊆ L that E is an extension of 〈D,T 〉 if and only if Cn(E ∪ {p,q, r}) is an extension of
〈D ∪C,T 〉. Moreover, the default theory 〈D ∪C,T ∪ {f}〉 has no extensions.
The set of defaults C introduced in Example 4 may then be used to establish that
NDL⇒ SNDL, i.e., NDL is strictly less expressive than SNDL.
Theorem 5. SNDL 
→NDL.
Proof. Let us assume that there is a PFM translation function Tr that maps a semi-normal
default theory 〈D,T 〉 into a normal one. Then recall the set of defaults C given in Example
4 and define a set of semi-normal defaults D = C ∪ { :f∧¬af }. Let 〈D′, T ′〉 be the translation
Tr(〈D,∅〉). Note that 〈D,∅〉 does not have extensions, but the normality of D′ guarantees
the existence of an extension E′ for 〈D′, T ′〉 [23, p. 106]. As Tr is faithful, E′ must be
inconsistent. A normal default theory 〈D′, T ′〉 has an inconsistent extension E′ if and only
if T ′ is inconsistent [23, p. 106]. Thus T ′ must be inconsistent.
Then consider the theory T = {a}. The default theory 〈D,T 〉 has a unique extension
E = Cn({a,p,q, r}) which is also propositionally consistent. The translation Tr(〈D,T 〉)
is 〈D′, T ′ ∪ T 〉 by the modularity of Tr. However, the theory T ′ ∪ T is also inconsistent
and thus 〈D′, T ′ ∪ T 〉 has only an inconsistent extension E′ = L′. But this contradicts the
faithfulness of Tr. ✷
We should next address the strictness of the relationship SNDL → DL. Thus we have
to investigate the possibility of obtaining a PFM translation from standard DL into SNDL.
The problem is how a default like (1) can be represented in terms of semi-normal defaults.
Then the main questions that arise are (i) how the consistency of the justifications is tested
and (ii) on what conditions the consequent is supposed to be inferable. As a concrete an-
swer, we propose a translation function TrSN which introduces a new atom cφ for each
φ ∈ Jf(D) ∪Cq(D) and a new atom bd for each d ∈D.
Definition 6. Let D be any set of defaults in L(A), A′ = {f,p,q, r} a set of new atoms
such that A∩A′ = ∅, and C the set of defaults from Example 4. For an individual default
d = α:β1,...,βn
γ
∈D, we define
TrSN(d)=
{ : bd ∧¬cβ1
bd
, . . . ,
: bd ∧¬cβn
bd
}
∪
{
α : γ ∧¬bd
γ
,
α : f∧¬bd ∧¬cγ
f
}
.
For a default theory 〈D,T 〉, we define
TrSN(〈D,T 〉)=
〈{ : cφ ∧ φ
cφ
| φ ∈ Jf(D)∪Cq(D)
}
∪
⋃
d∈D
TrSN(d)∪C,T
〉
.
The defaults introduced by TrSN have the following roles. (i) A default :cφ∧φcφ tests if ajustification or consequent φ is consistent, and allows derivation of cφ which means that
“φ is consistent”. (ii) The defaults :bd∧¬cβ1bd , . . . ,
:bd∧¬cβn
bd introduced for each d ∈D test
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collectively if all justifications β1, . . . , βn of d are consistent. If not, then bd is derived
by at least one of these defaults to indicate that “d is blocked”. (iii) The default α:γ∧¬bd
γ
is a semi-normal rewrite of the original default d . The consistency of the justifications
β1, . . . , βn is verified by checking that d is not blocked. (iv) Because of semi-normality,
the consequent γ of d appears as an additional justification of the preceding default. As
a side-effect, the default α:γ∧¬bd
γ
is not applicable when the justifications β1, . . . , βn are
consistent, but the consequent γ is not. To relax this problem, we have to introduce the
rules of C as well as a semi-normal default α:f∧¬bd∧¬cγf . This is to detect cases where d
would be applicable in principle, but γ is not derivable by α:γ∧¬bd
γ
, as γ is inconsistent.
In this case, the atom f is derived in order to ensure that no extension can result. It is
demonstrated by the following example how the set of defaults C is exploited in practice
to handle cases where a propositionally inconsistent extension would arise.
Example 7. Consider the set of defaults D = { d:e } and theories T1 = {d} and T2 = {d,¬e}
based on the language L({d,e}). The default theory 〈D,T1〉 has a unique extension
E1 = Cn({d,e}) while the default theory 〈D,T2〉 has a unique propositionally inconsistent
extension E2 = L. The translation TrSN(〈D,Ti 〉) is 〈D′ ∪C,Ti〉 where the set of defaults
D′ =
{ : ce ∧ e
ce
}
∪ TrSN
(
d :
e
)
=
{ : ce ∧ e
ce
,
d : e∧¬b
e
,
d : f∧¬b∧¬ce
f
}
.
Now 〈D′ ∪C,T1〉 has a unique extension E′1 = Cn({d, ce,e,p,q, r}) such that E1 =
E′1 ∩ L. On the other hand, the default theory 〈D′, T2〉 has an (anomalous) extension
E′2 = Cn({d,¬e, f}), but 〈D′ ∪C,T2〉 has no extensions.
Note that for i ∈ {1,2}, the propositionally consistent extensions of 〈D,Ti 〉 and the
translation TrSN(〈D,Ti 〉)= 〈D′ ∪C,Ti〉 are in a one-to-one correspondence and coincide
up to L. This observation suggests that TrSN is faithful, since the notion of faithfulness
introduced in Section 3 ignores propositionally inconsistent extensions. In order to prove
this in general, we introduce two mappings ExtSN and Ext in Definition 8. It will
be established in the sequel that these mappings are bijections between the classes of
propositionally consistent extensions of 〈D,T 〉 and TrSN(〈D,T 〉).
Definition 8. Let 〈D,T 〉 be a default theory in L(A),
A′ = {cφ | φ ∈ Jf(D) ∪Cq(D)} ∪ {bd | d ∈D} ∪ {f,p,q, r}
a set of new atoms such that A ∩ A′ = ∅, and C the set of defaults from Example 4.
Let 〈D′ ∪C,T 〉 be the translation TrSN(〈D,T 〉) in L′(A ∪A′). For every propositionally
closed theory E ⊆ L, define ExtSN(E) = Cn(E ∪ A) ⊆ L′ where A ⊆ A′ is a set of
atoms containing (i) the atoms p, q, and r appearing in C, (ii) the atom cφ for each
φ ∈ Jf(D) ∪ Cq(D) such that E ‖ φ, and (iii) the atom bd for each d = α:β1,...,βnγ ∈ D
such that E ∦ βi for some βi . For every propositionally closed theory E′ ⊆ L′, define
Ext(E′)=E′ ∩L.
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Proposition 9. Let 〈D,T 〉 be a default theory in L.
(1) If E ⊆ L is a propositionally consistent extension of 〈D,T 〉, then E′ = ExtSN(E) is a
propositionally consistent extension of TrSN(〈D,T 〉).
(2) If E′ is a propositionally consistent extension of TrSN(〈D,T 〉), then E = Ext(E′) is a
propositionally consistent extension of 〈D,T 〉.
(3) The propositionally consistent extensions of 〈D,T 〉 and TrSN(〈D,T 〉) are in a one-to-
one correspondence and coincide up to L.
Proof. The detailed proofs of the claims (1)–(3) appear in Appendix A.
The main result of this note is formulated as Theorem 10, which implies, together with
Proposition 3, that DL and SNDL are of equal expressive power and thus located in the
same class of EPH.
Theorem 10. DL→ SNDL.
Proof. It is obvious that TrSN is both polynomial and modular, while the faithfulness of
TrSN follows as a result of Proposition 9. ✷
An analogous result follows immediately for PDL and PSNDL. This is because
TrSN(〈D,T 〉) is both prerequisite-free and semi-normal, provided that 〈D,T 〉 is prerequi-
site-free. This property can easily be inspected from Definition 6. Consequently, PDL and
PSNDL reside in the same class of EPH.
Theorem 11. PDL→ PSNDL.
5. Related work
In this section, we address earlier work on translating normal and semi-normal defaults
[9,10,20,23]. Let us proceed in a chronological order. In an early paper [9], Grosof
analyses the possibilities of embedding default logic into circumscription. His idea is
to translate a normal default α:β
β
into formula circumscription [25] by setting α ∧ ¬β
subject to minimization while the truth value of β may vary freely. However, Grosof’s idea
cannot lead to a faithful translation in the sense explained in Section 3. This is because
(i) Grosof’s translation is polynomial and modular, (ii) by [25] formula circumscription
can be captured by ordinary circumscription [24] and thus also by CIRC, and (iii) the
classes of EPH indicate that CIRC⇒NDL. In fact, Imielinski [10, Theorem 3.1] provides
a concrete counter-example which implies NDL 
→CIRC and which applies to Grosof’s
translation, too. Etherington [5, p. 150] equates Grosof’s principle with a prerequisite-free
and normal default :α→β
α→β (note that falsifying α ∧¬β corresponds to setting α→ β true).
This interpretation leads to identical conclusions, as NDL 
→PNDL holds by the classes of
EPH.
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From a historical perspective, it is also worth mentioning an article [20] by Łukaszewicz,
who emphasizes the role of normal defaults in knowledge representation. For this reason,
Łukaszewicz suggests transforming any default α:β
γ
first into a semi-normal default α:γ∧β
γ
and then into a normal default α:γ∧β
γ∧β . By Theorem 10, the objective of the first step is re-
alistic, but Łukaszewicz does not provide a consistency checking mechanism to deal with
inconsistent consequents γ . Therefore, the set of defaults in Example 7 is not faithfully cap-
tured by his translation. More generally, the second translation considered by Łukaszewicz
cannot be faithful according to the result SNDL 
→NDL of Theorem 5.
Imielinski [10] presents results on a generalization of circumscription: the models
M ⊆ A for a propositional language L(A) may be ordered by an arbitrary preorder
(reflexive and transitive relation) . Note that various forms of circumscription [19,24,
25] correspond to specific preorders among models. A model M ⊆A of T is -minimal
if there is no model M ′ ⊆ A of T such that M ′ < M , i.e., M ′  M but M 
 M ′.
Then T |= φ holds, i.e., φ ∈ L is preferentially entailed by a theory T ⊆ L, if φ
is true in all -minimal models of T . According to Imielinski, a set of defaults D is
representable by a preorder relation  and an abnormality theory A given that φ belongs
to every extension of 〈D,T 〉 if and only if T ∪A |= φ. Imielinski presents a result [10,
Lemma 3.2 and subsequent discussion] that prerequisite-free and semi-normal defaults
are representable by some preorder relation (even with A = ∅). This is very surprising
in the light of our results (PSNDL ↔ PDL↔AEL) and Niemelä’s result [27, p. 101]
that AEL cannot be modularly translated into preferential entailment. This implies that
[10, Lemma 3.2] does not hold for arbitrary sets of prerequisite-free and semi-normal
defaults (only a single default is considered in Imielinski’s proof). A counter-example
follows.
Example 12. Recall D = { :p∧¬qp , :q∧¬rq , :r∧¬pr } from p. 239 and suppose that D is
modularly representable by a preorder with an abnormality theory A= ∅.
Given T1 = {p,q ↔ ¬r}, the default theory 〈D,T1〉 has a unique extension E1 =
Cn({p,q,¬r}). Note that T1 has two models M1 = {p,q} and M2 = {p, r}. Since ¬r ∈ E1
and D is modularly representable by  with an abnormality theory A= ∅, it follows that
T1 |= ¬r. Thus r must be false in all -minimal models of T1 implying that M1 < M2
must hold.
Then it follows by symmetry that M3 < M1 must hold for the models M1 and M3 =
{q, r} of T2 = {q, r ↔¬p}. Similarly, M2 <M3 must hold for the models M2 and M3 of
T3 = {r,p↔¬q}. Then M1 <M2 and M2 <M3 imply M1 M3 by the transitivity of .
A contradiction with M3 <M1.
Marek and Truszczyn´ski [23, Theorem 5.19] propose a translation function TrMT which
transforms a default theory 〈D,T 〉 into a weak semi-normal default theory 〈D′, T 〉 where
D′ contains semi-normal defaults or justification-free defaults α:
γ
which correspond to
monotonic inference rules α
γ
. A default d ∈ D of the form (1) is translated by TrMT
into α:c
d
1∧β1
cd1
, . . . ,
α:cdn∧βn
cdn
and c
d
1∧···∧cdn :
γ
where cd1 , . . . , c
d
n are new atoms. The defaults that
check the consistency of the justifications β1, . . . , βn are very similar to ours, except that
α appears as a prerequisite. The last default controls the derivation of the consequent γ of
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the original rule, but this is not a semi-normal default. Marek and Truszczyn´ski establish
that TrMT is PFM so that DL↔WSNDL. However, this does not imply that DL↔ SNDL,
since weak semi-normal theories have a richer syntax, so that SNDL → WSNDL holds.
Thus, in order to establish SNDL↔WSNDL, we should express justification-free defaults
in terms of semi-normal defaults. To achieve this, we may apply the translational technique
of Definition 6: a justification-free default α:
γ
is expressible by the semi-normal defaults
α:γ∧	
γ
,
α:f∧¬cγ
f , and
:cγ∧γ
cγ
together with the set of defaults C given in (2).
6. Conclusions
In this note, we apply a framework [16] based on polynomial, faithful, and modular
(PFM) translation functions for analyzing the expressive powers of two semi-normal
variants of Reiter’s default logic (DL). A non-trivial PFM translation function TrSN is
devised in order to establish the main results of this note: DL and semi-normal DL
(SNDL) are shown to be of equal expressive power by Theorem 10, and the same holds
true for prerequisite-free DL (PDL) and prerequisite-free SNDL (PSNDL), as shown by
Theorem 11. Therefore, we conclude that semi-normality does not affect the expressive
power of defaults according to the measure of expressiveness based on PFM translations.
In contrast to this, normality—although very close to semi-normality—decreases the
expressiveness of defaults, as normal DL (NDL) and prerequisite-free NDL (PNDL) are
less expressive than DL and PDL, respectively.
The results presented in Section 4 lead to new interpretations regarding the expressive
powers of semi-normal variants of DL. In contrast to a result achieved by Imielinski
[10, Lemma 3.2], the expressive power of PSNDL exceeds that of preferential entailment
(which includes various forms of circumscription). Moreover, the result that DL and SNDL
are of equal expressive power strengthens Marek and Truszczyn´ski’s corresponding result
[23, Theorem 5.19] for weak SNDL (WSNDL). Theorem 10 also implies that an arbitrary
default can be translated into defaults with exactly one justification, i.e., n= 1 holds in (1).
This tightens Marek and Truszczyn´ski’s result that unitary defaults with 0  n  1 are
sufficient to express all defaults [23, Corollary 5.20]. Finally, we remind the reader that
Reiter’s original definition of a default (1) required that n > 0. However, in harmony with
[23] we are ready to accept justification-free defaults with n = 0. Theorem 10 indicates
that this distinction is not significant: the expressive power of DL is not affected by this
choice.
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Appendix A. Proofs
The first of our two lemmas summarizes the effects on propositional reasoning when a
set of new literals L is added to a propositional theory T .
Lemma A.1. Let T ⊆ L(A) be a propositional theory and L a set of literals based on a
set of atomsA′ such thatA∩A′ = ∅. Thus T ∪L is a propositional theory in L′(A∪A′).
Let φ ∈L be any sentence and l any literal based on A′.
(1) T ∪L ‖ 	 ⇔ T ‖ 	 and L ‖ 	.
(2) If L ‖ 	, then (a) T ∪L |= φ ⇔ T |= φ, (b) T ∪L ‖ φ ⇔ T ‖ φ, and (c) T ∪L ‖ 	
⇔ T ‖ 	.
(3) If T ‖ 	, then (a) T ∪L |= l ⇔ L |= l, (b) T ∪L ‖ l ⇔ L ‖ l, and (c) T ∪L ‖ 	 ⇔
L ‖ 	.
(4) If L ‖ 	, then L |= l ⇔ l ∈L.
In the forthcoming lemma and the proof of Proposition 9, we are assuming the following
common definitions: 〈D,T 〉 is a default theory in L(A), A′ is the set of atoms from
Definition 8, C is the set of defaults from Example 4, and 〈D′ ∪C,T 〉 is the translation
TrSN(〈D,T 〉) in L′(A ∪A′). The reduct of D′ ∪ C with respect to a candidate extension
E′ is precomputed as follows.
Lemma A.2. If E ⊆ L(A) is a propositionally consistent and closed theory and A⊆A′,
then D′ ∪C and E′ = Cn(E ∪A)⊆ L′(A ∪A′) satisfy the following:
(R1) For every φ ∈ Jf(D) ∪Cq(D), the rule 	cφ ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ ⇔ E ‖ φ.
(R2) For every d = α:β1,...,βn
γ
∈D, 	bd ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ ⇔ cβi /∈A for some βi .
(R3) α
γ
∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ ⇔ for some d = α:β1,...,βnγ ∈D, bd /∈A and E ‖ γ .
(R4) αf ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ ⇔ for some d = α:β1,...,βnγ ∈D, bd /∈A and cγ /∈A.
(R5) 	p ∈ (D′ ∪ C)E′ ⇔ q /∈ A or f /∈ A, 	q ∈ (D′ ∪ C)E′ ⇔ r /∈ A or f /∈ A, and
	
r ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ ⇔ p /∈A or f /∈A.
Proof.
(R1) For φ ∈ Jf(D) ∪ Cq(D), we have E′ ‖ cφ ∧ φ ⇔ E ∪ {φ} ∪A∪ {cφ} ‖ 	 ⇔
E ∪ {φ} ‖ 	 by (2) in Lemma A.1, as A∪ {cφ} ‖ 	, ⇔ E ‖ φ.
(R2) Consider any default d = α:β1,...,βn
γ
∈ D. Now E′ ‖ bd ∧¬cβi holds ⇔ E ∪ A ∪
{bd,¬cβi } ‖ 	⇔ A∪ {bd,¬cβi } ‖ 	 by (3) in Lemma A.1, since E ‖ 	,⇔ cβi /∈A.
(R3) For any d = α:β1,...,βn
γ
∈D, E′ ‖ γ ∧¬bd ⇔ E ∪ {γ } ∪A∪ {¬bd} ‖ 	⇔ E ∪ {γ } ‖
	 and A∪ {¬bd} ‖ 	 by (1) in Lemma A.1 ⇔ E ‖ γ and bd /∈A. Hence the claim.
(R4) The claim holds, as for any d = α:β1,...,βn
γ
∈ D, E′ ‖ f∧¬bd ∧¬cγ ⇔ E ∪ A ∪
{f,¬bd,¬cγ } ‖ 	 ⇔ A ∪ {f,¬bd,¬cγ } ‖ 	 by (3) in Lemma A.1, because E ‖ 	,
⇔ bd /∈A and cγ /∈A.
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(R5) The justification of :p∧¬qp satisfies E′ ‖ p∧¬q ⇔ E ∪A∪ {p,¬q} ‖ 	 ⇔ A ∪{p,¬q} ‖ 	 by (3) in Lemma A.1, as E ‖ 	, ⇔ q /∈ A. Similarly, the justification
of :p∧¬fp satisfies E
′ ‖ p∧¬f ⇔ f /∈A. Thus E′ ‖ p∧¬q or E′ ‖ p∧¬f ⇔ q /∈ A or
f /∈A. The other two equivalences involving p, q, r, and f follow by symmetry. ✷
Proof of (1) in Proposition 9. LetE = CnDE (T ) be a propositionally consistent extension
of 〈D,T 〉. Define A ⊆ A′ and E′ = ExtSN(E) = Cn(E ∪ A) ⊆ L′(A ∪ A′) as in
Definition 8. Then E′ is propositionally consistent by Lemma A.1, as E and A are. Let
us now prove that E′ equals to F ′ = Cn(D′∪C)E′ (T ) using the relationships (R1)–(R5)
established in Lemma A.2.
(E′ ⊆ F ′) Let us first establish A⊆ F ′.
(1) Since f /∈ A by definition, it follows by (R5) that 	p , 	q , and 	r belong to (D′ ∪ C)E′ .
Hence {p,q, r} ⊆ F ′.
(2) If cφ ∈ A for φ ∈ Jf(D) ∪ Cq(D), it follows by the definition of A that E ‖ φ. Thus
	
cφ
∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ by (R1) and cφ ∈ F ′ follows.
(3) If bd ∈ A for d = α:β1,...,βnγ ∈ D, then E ∦ βi for some justification βi of d . Then
cβi /∈A holds by the definition of A and 	bd ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ follows by (R2). Thus bd ∈ F ′
holds.
It remains to establish E = CnDE (T ) ⊆ F ′. Induction on k  0 is used: if φ ∈ L is
DE -provable from T in k steps, then φ ∈ F ′.
Base case: k = 0. Then T |= φ holds for φ ∈ L. It follows that φ ∈ F ′, since T ⊆ F ′
and F ′ is closed under propositional consequence.
Induction step. Suppose that φ ∈ L is DE -provable from T in k steps, i.e., there
is a sequence of rules α1
γ1
, . . . ,
αk
γk
from DE such that T ∪ {γ1, . . . , γk} |= φ and T ∪
{γ1, . . . , γi−1} |= αi holds for all 0 < i  k. Then the prerequisites αi ∈ L are also
DE -provable from T , but in less than k steps. Thus {α1, . . . , αk} ⊆ F ′ follows by the
inductive hypothesis. Then consider any rule αi
γi
in the DE -proof. By the definition of
DE , there is di = αi :β(i,1),...,β(i,ni )γi ∈D such that E ‖ β(i,j) holds for each β(i,j) in di . Thus
bdi /∈ A by the definition of A. In addition, E ‖ γi holds, as γi ∈ E and E ‖ 	. Thus
{α1
γ1
, . . . , αk
γk
} ⊆ (D′ ∪ C)E′ by (R3) so that {γ1, . . . , γk} ⊆ F ′, by the closure properties
of F ′. Then φ ∈ F ′ follows by T ∪ {γ1, . . . , γk} |= φ.
To conclude, we note that A∪E ⊆ F ′ implies E′ = Cn(E ∪A)⊆ F ′.
(E′ ⊇ F ′) It is shown that E′ shares the closure properties of F ′.
(1) It is clear that T ⊆E′, since T ⊆E ⊆E′.
(2) The theory E′ = Cn(E ∪A) is propositionally closed.
(3) Let us then show that E′ = Cn(E ∪ A) is closed under the rules of (D′ ∪ C)E′
using (R1)–(R5). (a) Suppose that 	cφ ∈ (D′ ∪ C)E′ for φ ∈ Jf(D) ∪ Cq(D). Then
E ‖ φ by (R1). It follows by the definition of A that cφ ∈ A ⊆ E′. (b) Assume that
	
bd ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ for d =
α:β1,...,βn
γ
∈D. Then we obtain by (R2) that cβi /∈A for some
justification βi of d . The definition of A implies that E ∦ βi and bd ∈A⊆E′. (c) Then
T. Janhunen / Artificial Intelligence 144 (2003) 233–250 247
assume that α
γ
∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ and α ∈E′. Since α ∈ L, α ∈E′ = Cn(E∪A), and A ‖ 	
trivially, we obtain E |= α by (2) in Lemma A.1. Then α ∈ E, as E is propositionally
closed. Moreover, (R3) implies that bd /∈ A and E ‖ γ hold for some default d =
α:β1,...,βn
γ
∈D. Thus E ‖ βi holds by the definition of A for each justification βi of d
so that α
γ
∈DE . Thus also γ ∈E = CnDE (T ) and γ ∈E′ = Cn(E ∪A). (d) Suppose
that αf ∈ (D′ ∪ C)E′ and α ∈ E′. It follows that α ∈ E in the same way as above.
In addition, (R4) implies that bd /∈ A and cγ /∈ A for some d = α:β1,...,βnγ ∈D. Since
bd /∈ A it follows by the definition of A that E ‖ βi holds for each justification βi of
d . This implies that α
γ
∈ DE and γ ∈ E. On the other hand, cγ /∈ A implies by the
definition of A that E ∦ γ , i.e., E |= ¬γ . But then E is inconsistent, a contradiction.
Thus αf is not applicable. (e) The definition of A and (R5) imply that 	p , 	q and 	r
belong to (D′ ∪C)E′ . Also, {p,q, r} ⊆A⊆E′ by the definition of A. ✷
Proof of (2) in Proposition 9. Let E′ = Cn(D′∪C)E′ (T ) be a propositionally consistent
extension of the translation TrSN(〈D,T 〉)= 〈D′ ∪C,T 〉 and define E = Ext(E′)=E′ ∩L
as in Definition 8. Using a characterization of extensions [23, Theorem 3.57], we obtain
E′ = Cn(T ∪ ′) where ′ ⊆ {γ ′ | α′
γ ′ ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ }. The structure of D′ ∪C implies that
′ can be partitioned into two disjoint sets of consequents  = ′ ∩ L and A= ′ ∩A′.
Then E′ = Cn(T ∪  ∪ A) and E = E′ ∩ L imply E = Cn(T ∪ ) by Lemma A.1.
Consequently, E′ = Cn(E ∪A) and E = E′ ∩ L is propositionally consistent and closed.
Thus Lemma A.2 becomes applicable to E, A, D′ ∪C, and E′.
Assume that f ∈ A. Since E′ ‖ 	 and :p∧¬qp and :p∧¬fp are the only defaults of D′ ∪ C
having p as a consequent, it follows by (R5) that p ∈A⇔ 	p ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ ⇔ q /∈A. Quite
similarly, q ∈ A ⇔ r /∈ A and r ∈ A ⇔ p /∈ A hold by the symmetry in C. Thus p ∈ A ⇔
p /∈A. A contradiction, so that f /∈A holds. Now we are ready to establish that E =E′ ∩L
equals to F = CnDE (T ).
(E ⊆ F ) It is proven using induction on k  0 that if φ ∈ L is (D′ ∪C)E′ -provable from
T in k steps, then φ ∈ F .
Base case: k = 0, i.e., T |= φ holds for φ ∈L. Because T ⊆ F and F is propositionally
closed, we obtain φ ∈ F .
Induction step. Consider φ ∈ L that is (D′ ∪ C)E′ -provable from T in k steps, i.e.,
there is a sequence α
′
1
γ ′1
, . . . ,
α′k
γ ′k
of rules from (D′ ∪ C)E′ such that T ∪ {γ ′1, . . . , γ ′k} |= φ
and T ∪ {γ ′1, . . . , γ ′i−1} |= α′i holds for each 0 < i  k. Every γ ′i ∈ Cq(D′ ∪C), i.e., either
γ ′i ∈ Cq(D)⊆ L or γ ′i ∈A′. Thus T ∪ {γ1, . . . , γl} |= φ where 0 l  k and {γ1, . . . , γl} =
{γ ′1, . . . , γ ′k}∩L holds by (2) in Lemma A.1. Then consider any γi (0 < i  l) and αiγi in the
(D′ ∪C)E′ -proof. By (R3), there is di = αi :β(i,1),...,β(i,ni )γi ∈D such that bdi /∈A and E ‖ γi .
Thus 	bdi /∈ (D
′ ∪C)E′ must hold. By (R2) we obtain cβ(i,j) ∈A for each justification β(i,j)
of di . This holds only if 	cβ(i,j) ∈ (D
′ ∪C)E′ for each justification β(i,j). By (R1), E ‖ β(i,j)
holds for each justification β(i,j) of di so that αiγi ∈DE . Moreover, the prerequisite αi ∈L is
(D′ ∪C)E′ -provable from T in less than k steps. Thus αi ∈ F by the inductive hypothesis,
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and γi ∈ F , as F is closed under the rules of DE . Thus we have that T ∪ {γ1, . . . , γl} ⊆ F .
This implies φ ∈ F , as T ∪ {γ1, . . . , γl} |= φ and F is propositionally closed.
(E ⊇ F ) It is established that E shares the closure properties of F .
(1) Since T ⊆ L and T ⊆E′ = Cn(D′∪C)E′ (T ), it follows that T ⊆E =E′ ∩L.
(2) Suppose that φ ∈ L belongs to Cn(E). Since E′ = Cn(E′) and E ⊆E′, it follows that
φ ∈E′ so that φ ∈E.
(3) Then consider any α
γ
∈DE such that α ∈E. Thus E ‖ βi holds for each justification βi
of some default d = α:β1,...,βn
γ
∈D. It follows by (R1) for each βi that 	cβi ∈ (D
′ ∪C)E′
and cβi ∈ E′ so that cβi ∈ A follows by the definition of A. Then (R2) implies that	
bd /∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ . Because 	bd is the only rule having bd as a consequent, it follows that
bd /∈ E′ and bd /∈ A by the definition of A. Then suppose that E ∦ γ . It follows that
E′ ∦ cγ ∧ γ . Then 	cγ /∈ (D′ ∪C)E′ and since this is the only rule with the consequent
cγ , we obtain cγ /∈ E′ and cγ /∈ A. Then (R4) implies that αf ∈ (D′ ∪ C)E′ so that
f ∈ E′ and f ∈ A, a contradiction. Hence E ‖ γ must hold so that α
γ
∈ (D′ ∪ C)E′
follows by (R3). Then α ∈ E implies α ∈ E′ and γ ∈ E′ = Cn(D′∪C)E′ (T ). Thus also
γ ∈E holds, as γ ∈L. ✷
Proof of (3) in Proposition 9. It suffices to show that the mappings ExtSN and Ext given
in Definition 8 are injective and inverses of each other.
Let us assume there are two propositionally consistent extensions E1 and E2 of 〈D,T 〉
such that ExtSN(E1)= ExtSN(E2). This implies that Cn(E1 ∪A1)= Cn(E2 ∪A2) where
A1 ⊆A′ and A2 ⊆A′ are determined by Definition 8. It follows that Cn(E1 ∪A1) ∩L=
Cn(E2 ∪ A2) ∩ L. By (2) in Lemma A.1 we know that E1 = Cn(E1 ∪ A1) ∩ L and
E2 = Cn(E2 ∪A2)∩L. Thus E1 =E2.
Then suppose that there are two propositionally consistent extensions E′1 =
Cn(D
′∪C)E′1 (T ) and E′2 = Cn
(D′∪C)E′2 (T ) of the translation TrSN(〈D,T 〉) such that
Ext(E′1) = Ext(E′2). It follows that E′1 ∩ L = E′2 ∩ L = E and E ‖ 	. Then consider
any i ∈ {1,2}. It follows by the proof of (2) in Proposition 9 that E′i = Cn(Ei ∪Ai) where
Ei = E′i ∩ L and Ai = E′i ∩ A′ such that f /∈ Ai . Thus E′i = Cn(E ∪ Ai). Let us now
establish step by step that A1 =A2.
(1) By (R1), it holds for any φ ∈ Jf(D) ∪ Cq(D) that 	cφ ∈ (D′ ∪ C)E′1 ⇔ E ‖ φ ⇔	
cφ
∈ (D′ ∪ C)E′2 . Thus cφ ∈ E′1 ⇔ cφ ∈ E′2 so that cφ ∈ A1 ⇔ cφ ∈ A2 by Lemma
A.1, as E ‖ 	.
(2) Then consider any d = α:β1,...,βn
γ
∈ D. It follows by (R2) and the previous item that
	
bd ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′1 ⇔ cβi /∈A1 for some βi ⇔ cβi /∈A2 for some βi ⇔ 	bd ∈ (D′ ∪C)E′2 .
Thus bd ∈ E′1 ⇔ bd ∈ E′2 which implies by Lemma A.1 that bd ∈ A1 ⇔ bd ∈ A2, as
E ‖ 	.
(3) Since f /∈A1 and f /∈A2, the rules 	p , 	q , and 	r belong to (D′ ∪C)E′1 and (D′ ∪C)E′2
by (R5). Thus {a,b, c} ⊆A1 and {a,b, c} ⊆A2.
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Since there are no other atoms inA′, we have A1 =A2 as well as E′1 =E′2. Thus ExtSN
and Ext are bijections and inverses of each other, as Ext(ExtSN(E)) = ExtSN(E) ∩ L =
Cn(E ∪A)∩L=E. To conclude, the propositionally consistent extensions of 〈D,T 〉 and
Tr(〈D,T 〉) are in a one-to-one correspondence and coincide up to L. ✷
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